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Residency Restrictions and Why 
States Should Abstain 
any parents are terrified to learn that a convicted sex 
offender is living amongst their children, perhaps just a 
few doors from their home.  One need only view Dateline’s 
popular investigative television series “To Catch a Predator” to 
learn of the public’s fear of and fascination with sexual 
pedophiles.1  Over the last few decades, every new year seems to 
bring another high-profile child-sex-offender case.  In 1994, 
seven-year-old Megan Kanka was kidnapped, raped, and 
murdered by a convicted sex offender living across the street 
unbeknownst to her family.2  In 2005, nine-year-old Jessica 
Lunsford was abducted from her bedroom and sexually 
assaulted by a convicted sex offender staying at his sister-in-law’s 
home next door; she was found buried in a neighbor’s yard three 
 
∗ Justin H. Boyd, Juris Doctorate expected 2008 from the University of Oregon 
School of Law.  The author would like to thank Keith Hirokawa, professor at Texas 
Wesleyan School of Law, for his guidance and much appreciated advice. 
1 See Peter Johnson, ‘Dateline’ Roots Out Predators, USA TODAY.COM, Feb. 15, 
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/life/columnist/mediamix/2006-02-14-media-mix_x 
.htm. 
2 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, MANAGING SEX OFFENDERS:  CITIZENS 
SUPPORTING LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (2005), http://www.policevolunteers.org/ 
resources/pdf/cisomResourceGuide.pdf. 
M 
BOYD.FMT 2/22/2008  1:43:47 PM 
220 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 219 
weeks later.3  These types of heinous attacks bring anger and 
confusion, as the community wonders why more was not done to 
prevent known offenders from preying on our nation’s youth.  In 
response to the public outcry, Congress and state legislatures 
have enacted sex offender laws in an attempt to assuage the 
community’s fears.4 
In 2005 alone, state legislatures across the nation enacted 
more than 100 sex offender laws5 in an attempt to manage and 
control their sex offender populations.  More recently, Congress 
enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, allowing law enforcement agencies better access to registry 
information to help them track sex offenders’ movements.6  As a 
result of these new legal measures, over half a million offenders 
are listed in mandatory state sex offender registries,7 and each 
year there are 60,000 to 70,000 new arrests on charges of child 
sexual assault.8  Given the magnitude of the problem, it is hardly 
surprising that few citizens are sympathetic toward sex 
offenders’ constitutional rights. 
A new trend in state legislation emerged as twenty-two states 
entered legally unsettled waters by enacting various residency 
restrictions for convicted sex offenders.9  Legislators tout the 
 
3 Associated Press, Jury:  Child-Killer Couey Should Get Death, MSNBC.COM, 
Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17615925/. 
4 See, e.g., Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(e) (West 2005)); Jessica Lunsford Act, 2005 Fla. 
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2005–28 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
Florida Statutes). 
5 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 2, at 4. 
6 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (West Supp 2007)). 
7 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 2, at 1. 
8 MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT:  A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 1 (2006) available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf. 
9 Id. at 17 tbl.2 (ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
128(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608.5(f) (West 
Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4(b-5) (West 2003 
& Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
17.495 (West 2006 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2004 & Supp. 
2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.538 (2005 & Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 28.735 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2007); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 589.417 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN § 29-11A-5.1 
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need for such residency restrictions to reduce child sex 
offenders’ opportunities for contact with potential victims.10  
However, courts disagree whether these new laws are 
constitutional, and research increasingly questions their utility.  
This Comment will first look at the primary legal questions 
facing the courts, examining various legal challenges to state 
residency restrictions and the limited research surrounding the 
efficacy of such restrictions.  Next, this Comment will address 
the 2006 California ballot measure Proposition 83,11 which serves 
as a practical case study of these new restrictions and their 
unsettled legal ramifications.  Finally, this Comment will 
examine Oregon’s nonmandatory residency restriction12 and 
explain why it serves as the best model for achieving the goals of 
protecting our children, monitoring the sex offender population, 
and withstanding judicial review.  Ultimately, this Comment will 
attempt to show that research on mandatory residency 
restrictions may affect the way future courts rule on these 
restrictions.  This Comment will also attempt to persuade those 
presently in favor of mandatory residency restrictions that more 
flexible, nonmandatory restrictions will increase the likelihood 
of achieving their stated objectives. 
I 
OVERVIEW OF ENACTED RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
In 1995, Florida, Delaware, and Michigan became the first 
states to enact some form of sex offender residency restrictions.13  
 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (West Supp. 2007); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.187 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 9.94A.712, 9.95.425-430 (West 2003 & Supp 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
62-12-26(b)(1) (West 2006)). 
10 See David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of 
Fear:  The Case for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public 
Safety Laws, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 610 (2006). 
11 Cal. Attorney Gen., Proposition 83 Official Title and Summary, 
http://voterguide.ss.ca.gov/props/prop83/prop83.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007) 
(The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act:  Jessica’s Law) (qualified for 
California November 2006 ballot). 
12 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642 (2005); OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009 (2005). 
13 Singleton, supra note 10, at 607. 
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Today, twenty-two states have enacted residency restrictions.14  
Most commonly, these restrictions prohibit a designated class of 
sex offenders from permanently residing within 500 to 2500 feet 
of schools, daycares, or other places where children regularly 
congregate.15  This section describes the common facial 
challenges to these restrictions, provides examples of various 
states’ mandatory residency restrictions, and explains how courts 
have ruled on their constitutionality. 
A.  Primary Facial Challenges to Residency Restrictions 
Although they are a politically unpopular group, sex offenders 
have rights that are protected by the Constitution.  However, 
courts and legal scholars have difficulty identifying these rights 
and balancing them with a state’s legitimate interest in 
protecting its community.  While a sex offender could assert a 
number of as-applied challenges against a mandatory residency 
restriction, the first hurdle any statute must clear is to be found 
constitutional on its face.  In general, those opposing residency 
restrictions assert three types of facial constitutional challenges:  
ex post facto challenges, challenges on substantive or procedural 
due process grounds, and challenges based on whether the 
restriction is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.16 
First, the ex post facto challenge argues that residency 
restrictions are punitive rather than regulatory in nature, and 
thus create a problem of double jeopardy for offenders whose 
convictions are already final.  The Constitution expressly forbids 
states from enacting ex post facto laws, which include any law 
that increases punishment after a crime has been committed.17  
The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause was to “restrain[] 
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.”18  In ruling to 
uphold Alaska’s sex offender registration and notification law in 
 
14 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8, at 17 tbl.2. 
15 Id. at 15. 
16 Id. at 43. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, 
Out of Mind:  State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 727–
39 (2005); Bret R. Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts:  How Far May States Go to Keep 
Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 978–87, 990–92 
(2006). 
18 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981); accord Duster, supra note 17, at 
727. 
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Smith v. Doe,19 the Supreme Court established a framework to 
determine if a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The five 
relevant factors to consider include:  (1) whether the restriction 
has historically been regarded as a punishment, (2) whether the 
restriction imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) 
whether the restriction promotes the traditional aims of 
punishment, namely retribution and deterrence, (4) whether the 
restriction has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, 
and (5) whether the restriction is excessive with respect to this 
purpose.20 
Second, a residency restriction may face a substantive and 
procedural due process challenge.21  These arguments are based 
on an individual’s right to travel freely from state to state, to live 
in one’s home, to live privately with one’s family, and to receive 
an individual risk assessment.22  Sex offenders raise these due 
process challenges in an attempt to force courts to apply the 
strict scrutiny standard of review, rather than the highly 
deferential rational basis standard.23 
Finally, even if the residency restriction does not infringe on a 
constitutional right, it may be unconstitutional if it is not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.24  Under this 
deferential standard, “the party challenging the statute must 
demonstrate that the classification bears no rational relationship 
to any legitimate legislative purpose or governmental objective, 
or that the classification is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious.”25  Given the high deference afforded to a legislature, 
some scholars have termed this test a “toothless standard.”26  
Accordingly, no party has yet been successful in overturning a 
 
19 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (citing the framework established in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)). 
20 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  For a detailed analysis of each factor, see Hobson, supra 
note 17, at 981–85. 
21 See Duster, supra note 17, at 744–68; Hobson, supra note 17, at 971–78, 987–90. 
22 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8, at 43. 
23 See Hobson, supra note 17, at 972. 
24 See generally Singleton, supra note 10, at 617–22. 
25 Id. at 618. 
26 Id. (citing David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33 (“For the most part, rational basis review has been notoriously 
toothless.”)). 
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residency restriction by challenging the state’s rational basis for 
enacting the measure.27 
Those opposing mandatory residency restrictions regularly 
assert these three facial challenges.  For example, as discussed 
below, state and federal courts in Iowa, Georgia, Illinois, and 
Ohio have considered all three challenges while ruling on the 
constitutionality of residency restrictions.  A review of the most 
notable cases from these states will illustrate the current law 
concerning mandatory residency restrictions. 
B.  Mandatory Residency Restrictions in Court 
1.  Iowa 
The legal debate over the constitutionality of mandatory 
residency restrictions surfaced following the Doe v. Miller case in 
Iowa, which was challenged in the U.S. district court and the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.28  In 2002, the Iowa legislature 
enacted a law that prohibited all convicted sex offenders whose 
offenses involved minors from living within 2000 feet of a school 
or daycare center.29  This law applied to any sex offender 
establishing a new residence within the restricted area after the 
law was enacted on July 1, 2002.30  The measure affected a 
significant number of offenders; as of December 1, 2003, there 
were over 5000 registered sex offenders in Iowa, and 83 percent 
of their victims were minors.31  The plaintiffs filed a class action 
suit, and the U.S. district court ruled that the residency 
restriction was unconstitutional on a number of grounds.32  The 
district court held that the restriction posed an ex post facto 
problem, as it mandated additional punishment for convicted 
offenders.33  The court held that under practical application of 
 
27 See Singleton, supra note 10, at 618. 
28 Doe v. Miller (Miller I) , 298 F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004); rev’d, Doe v. 
Miller (Miller II), 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).  
Although not discussed in this Comment, the law was challenged and treated 
similarly in state court.  See State v. Seering, No. CRIM AGIN006718, 2003 WL 
21738894 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 20, 2003); rev’d, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005). 
29 IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003). 
30 Id. 
31 Miller I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
32 Id. at 880. 
33 Id. at 866–71. 
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the law, “some sex offenders end up remaining in prison beyond 
their parole dates, choosing between living with their families or 
complying with the Act, going homeless or breaking the law, or 
simply leaving the State because no community has a legal space 
for them.”34  This form of banishment constituted additional 
punishment that was not regulatory in nature.35  Furthermore, 
the Act violated sex offenders’ substantive due process rights.36  
Citing numerous Supreme Court cases on an individual’s 
fundamental rights, the district court held that the Act deprived 
the plaintiffs of their “right to personal choice regarding family 
matters”37 and their right to travel freely from one state to 
another.38  In addition, the court found that the Act violated 
procedural due process rights by failing to require an individual 
risk assessment for each offender,39 and represented cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.40 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district 
court’s decision on every ground challenged.41  Citing the 
framework applied by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe,42 the 
majority of the Eighth Circuit found the legislative intent 
regulatory in nature and held that the law was not “‘so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate’ the State’s nonpunitive 
intent.”43  Furthermore, the court unanimously held that the 
Constitution asserts no substantive due process right to “live 
where you want.”44  The law neither restricted a sex offender 
“from entering or leaving any part of the State, including areas 
within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility,”45 nor “directly 
regulated the family relationship or prevent[ed] any family 
member from residing with a sex offender in a residence that is 
 
34 Id. at 869. 
35 Id. at 871. 
36 Id. at 872. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 874–75. 
39 Id. at 876–77. 
40 Id. at 879–80. 
41 Miller II, 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2005). 
42 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
43 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 718 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92). 
44 Id. at 714. 
45 Id. at 713. 
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consistent with the statute.”46  Finally, there was no procedural 
due process violation, as once the state draws a legislative 
classification without a potential exemption, performing an 
individual risk assessment is unnecessary.47  Since the state had 
not infringed upon a constitutional right, the court found that it 
had a rational basis for “regulating the residency of sex offenders 
. . . to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Iowa.”48  To 
support its finding that the statute was rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest, the court noted that twelve other states 
had enacted residency restrictions for similar reasons.49 
2.  Georgia 
Iowa is not the only state to experience a facial challenge to its 
residency restriction.  In 2003, Georgia easily passed what State 
Representative Jerry Keen called “the toughest law in the 
country” in response to the arrest of Jessica Lunsford’s murderer 
in Georgia.50  The statute prohibited sex offenders from living, 
working, or loitering within 1000 feet of places where children 
congregate, including schools, churches, parks, gyms, swimming 
pools, or school bus stops.51  Keen stated:  “Yes, it’s an 
inconvenience, some folks will have to move on. . . . But if you 
weigh that argument against the overall impact, which is the 
safety of children, most folks would agree this is a good thing.”52 
Georgia was the first state to include the bus stop provision in its 
restriction, severely limiting the available areas where a sex 
offender could reside; there were approximately 10,000 
registered sex offenders in the state and over 150,000 school bus 
stops.53  In DeKalb County alone, located in suburban Atlanta, 
 
46 Id. at 711. 
47 Id. at 709. 
48 Id. at 704–05. 
49 Id. at 714 n.4. 
50 Jenny Jarvie, Georgia Sex Offender Rule Causes Stir, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3, 
2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003101190 
_offender03 .html. 
51 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2006); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-
12(a)(3) (Supp. 2006) (provides definition of “area where minors congregate”). 
52 Jarvie, supra note 50. 
53 Id. 
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the bus stop provision would force all 490 registered sex 
offenders to move out of the county.54 
Civil rights groups challenged the bus stop provision in federal 
court, where District Court Judge Clarence Cooper issued a 
temporary restraining order against the bus stop provision.55  In 
his ruling, Judge Cooper stated that he understood the state’s 
interest in protecting the public, but concluded, “the Court 
cannot approve of doing so in a manner that offends the 
Constitution.”56  However, Judge Cooper reluctantly lifted the 
restraining order on July 25, 2006, because the statute required a 
local school board to formally designate each bus stop, and none 
had done so at the time of the ruling.57  Moreover, Judge Cooper 
expressly noted that by lifting the restraining order he did not 
address the overall constitutionality of the law.58  The lawsuit 
challenging the law’s constitutionality is still pending.59  
However, a federal district court and a state court of appeals 
have previously upheld less restrictive versions of the state’s 
residency restrictions enacted prior to the latest amended 
version.60 
3.  Illinois 
Illinois’s version of a mandatory residency restriction was 
upheld by a state court of appeals in People v. Leroy.61  Under 
the Illinois Criminal Code, “It is unlawful for a child sex 
offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a playground . . . 
or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed 
toward persons under 18 years of age.”62  However, sex 
offenders are exempted from this law if they purchased their 
 
54 Id. 
55 Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006). 
56 Id. at *3. 
57 See Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC, at *3–5 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 
2006). 
58 Id. at *5. 
59 Associated Press, Judge Drops Ban on Sex Offenders Living near Bus Stops in 
Georgia, ACCESSNORTHGA.COM, July 27, 2006, http://www.accessnorthga.com/ 
news/ap_newfullstory.asp?ID=78151. 
60 See Doe v. Baker, No. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006); 
Denson v. State, 600 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
61 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
62 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4(b-5) (West Supp. 2007). 
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homes prior to the effective date of the amended restriction.63  
Among other challenges, the plaintiff in Leroy argued that the 
residency restriction violated his substantive due process right to 
live with his mother, whose house was located within 500 feet of 
a school.64  The court disagreed, holding that the statute did not 
restrict with whom a sex offender may live, and that instead “it 
merely restrict[s] where, geographically, a child sex offender may 
live.”65  Since no substantive due process right was violated, the 
court applied the rational basis test.66  Notably, the court 
recognized that no research supported the efficacy of a residency 
restriction, but nonetheless found a conceivable basis for finding 
the statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest: 
Although the record is bare of any statistics or research 
correlating residency distance with sex offenses, we conclude 
that it is reasonable to believe that a law that prohibits child 
sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a school will reduce 
the amount of incidental contact child sex offenders have with 
the children attending that school and that consequently the 
opportunity for the child sex offenders to commit new sex 
offenses against those children will be reduced as well.
67
 
Moreover, the court reasoned that since Illinois’s 500-foot 
requirement was less restrictive than those of twelve other states, 
the statute was reasonable in relation to the state’s interest.68  
The court also rejected an ex post facto challenge,69 
distinguishing the statute from the banishment effect found in 
Miller I,70 a procedural due process challenge,71 and an Eighth 
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenge.72 
4.  Ohio 
Finally, although the plaintiffs ultimately lacked standing to 
bring a claim, a district court in Ohio rejected the claim that the 
 
63 Id. 
64 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776. 
65 Id. (emphasis added). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 777. 
68 Id. at 778. 
69 Id. at 782. 
70 Id. at 780. 
71 Id. at 778. 
72 Id. at 784. 
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Ohio residency restriction constituted a criminal statute for 
standing purposes.73  However, the court noted that its ruling 
would likely foreshadow an ex post facto challenge.74  Section 
2950.031 of the Ohio Code “forbids registered sex offenders 
from establishing a residence or occupying a residential premises 
that is located within 1,000 feet of a school premises.”75  As in 
Miller II, the court applied the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Doe 
test76 to determine if the statute was punitive in nature.77  The 
most important factors in the test are whether there is a 
“rational connection between the statute and a nonpunitive 
purpose.”78  In finding the statute to be civil in nature, the court 
concluded that although there may be better alternatives than a 
mandatory residency restriction, “[t]he Court does not sit to 
judge whether the legislature has made the best possible choice 
in attempting to protect children from sex offenders.”79 
Thus, courts in Iowa, Georgia, Illinois, and Ohio have 
considered all three facial challenges to the constitutionality of 
their sex offender residency restrictions.  Except for Miller I, all 
the courts found that the mandatory residency restrictions 
withstood constitutional review.  However, as discussed below, 
no clear consensus exists among courts today, and new research 
about the effectiveness of residency restrictions could change the 
way courts approach these decisions. 
II 
RESEARCH CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESIDENCY 
RESTRICTIONS 
In addition to the constitutional concerns about residency 
restrictions, many critics argue that the research does not 
support enacting these new laws.  First, critics argue that 
statistics fail to support the need for or the efficacy of the 
restrictions.  Second, several states actively oppose the 
restrictions based on their own research.  These concerns, as well 
 
73 Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 885 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
74 Id. at 885 n.1. 
75 Id. at 880. 
76 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003). 
77 Coston, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 885. 
78 Id. at 886 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102–03). 
79 Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 105). 
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as research indicating that the restrictions produce unintended 
consequences, raise potential legal ramifications concerning 
previous state and federal court decisions. 
A.  Statistics Fail to Support the Enactment of Mandatory 
Residency Restrictions 
Darcey Baker, Board Member of Oregon’s Department of 
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, states that many sex 
offender residency restrictions are no more than “knee-jerk 
reactions to high-profile cases.”80  In response to highly 
publicized violent abductions and murders committed by 
convicted sex offenders, a misconception exists that sex 
offenders have higher rates of recidivism than other criminal 
offenders.  Therefore, many believe that states are justified in 
imposing harsher limitations on their freedoms.  However, one 
of the largest and most recognized studies on this issue, based on 
over 20,000 sex offenders, found recidivism rates of only 18.9 
percent for rapists and 12.7 percent for child molesters.81  In 
comparison, a United States Department of Justice study of 
fifteen states found that over 67 percent of prisoners released in 
1994 were rearrested within three years.82  More specifically, the 
study found that 53.4 percent of property offenders, 47 percent 
of drug offenders, and 39.9 percent of violent offenders were 
reconvicted of the same offense within three years.83 
Despite these numbers, supporters of residency restrictions 
rightly maintain that, given the nature of a sex offense involving 
a minor, any repeat offense is unacceptable.  However, there 
remains little, if any, real or empirical research showing that 
residency restrictions reduce the risk of reoffending.84  One 
 
80 Telephone Interview with Darcey Baker, Board Member, Oregon Board of 
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, in Eugene, Or. (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter 
Baker]. 
81 TIM BYNUM ET AL., CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT, RECIDIVISM OF SEX 
OFFENDERS (2001), http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html. 
82 Eileen Fry-Bowers, Controversy and Consequence in California:  Choosing 
Between Children and the Constitution, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 889, 909 (2004) (citing 
BUREAU OF J. STATISTICS, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.:  RECIDIVISM (2002), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm). 
83 Id. (citing BUREAU OF J. STATISTICS, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.:  
RECIDIVISM (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm). 
84 See Jill S. Levenson, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, in SEX OFFENDER 
LAW REPORT (Civil Research Institute 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/ 
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Arkansas study reported that 48 percent of child molesters lived 
near schools, daycare centers, or parks.85  Although the authors 
speculated that repeat offenders are more likely to live in places 
where children congregate, this study could not prove a link 
between sex offender housing and recidivism.86  Conversely, a 
Minnesota study found that there was no causal relationship 
between a school’s proximity to an offender’s residence and the 
likelihood of the offender committing another sex offense for 
the most serious sex offenders who were released between 1997 
and 1999.87  As a New York Times editorial opined, “[j]ust as it 
would feel foolish to forbid muggers to live near A.T.M.s, it is 
hard to imagine how a 1,000-foot buffer zone around a bus stop, 
say, would keep a determined pedophile at bay.”88 
Moreover, the need for residency restrictions rests on the 
myth of “stranger danger,” since much of the public believes the 
majority of sex offenses are committed by unknown 
perpetrators.89  In fact, a 1997 study by the Department of 
Justice found that only 7 percent of reported sex offenses 
involving children were committed by strangers.90  
Approximately 40 percent of sexual assaults occur in the victim’s 
own home, and another 20 percent occur in the home of a friend, 
neighbor or relative.91 
Perhaps more troubling than the risk that residency 
restrictions will prove ineffective are the negative, unintended 
consequences of such measures.  These restrictions create a 
shortage of housing options for sex offenders, forcing them to 




85 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8, at 19 (citing J.T. Walker et. al., The Geographic 
Link Between Sex Offenders and Potential Victims:  A Routine Activities Approach, 
JUSTICE RESEARCH AND POLICY, Fall 2001, at 15). 
86 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8, at 19. 
87 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL 
PLACEMENT ISSUES 9 (2003). 
88 Editorial, Sex Offenders in Exile, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/opinion/30sat1.html?ex=1325134800&en=f5d41
ffaa6709904&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
89 See Levenson, supra note 84, at *4. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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displacing them from their familial support systems.92  As Jill 
Levenson, author of a nationally recognized study on sex 
offenders, concluded, “disrupting offenders’ stability and social 
bonds is unlikely to be in the public’s best interest if it 
exacerbates the psychosocial stressors that can contribute to 
reoffending.”93  In addition, residency restrictions place 
enormous demands on law enforcement officers, whose 
resources have already been limited by stringent federal 
reporting and notification laws.  Notably, less than a year after 
the Miller II opinion, the Iowa County Attorneys Association 
issued a statement urging the repeal of the newly enacted 
residency restriction.94  Citing research showing that the 2000-
foot residency restriction was ineffective, the Association stated 
that the law “does not provide the protection that was originally 
intended and that the cost of enforcing the requirement and the 
unintended effects on families of offenders warrant replacing the 
restriction with more effective protective measures.”95 
B.  States Opposing Mandatory Residency Restrictions 
Colorado and Minnesota have been the most vocal states in 
rejecting mandatory residency restrictions and the most 
receptive to the limited research on the topic.  In 2004, the 
Colorado Department of Public Safety concluded, “[p]lacing 
restrictions on the location of correctionally supervised sex 
offender residences may not deter the sex offender from re-
offending and should not be considered as a method to control 
sexual offending recidivism.”96  After reviewing the actions of 
sex offenders on parole for a period of fifteen months, Colorado 
found that the number of offenders living near schools and 
childcare centers who reoffended was no greater than offenders 
living elsewhere.  Instead, Colorado found that sex offenders 
 
92 Id. at *5. 
93 Id. at *6. 
94 IOWA COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATEMENT ON SEX OFFENDER 
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS IN IOWA (2006), www.cacj.org/PDF/2006/Statement 
%20on%20Sex%20Offender%20Residency%20Restrictions.pdf. 
95 Id. 
96 OFFICE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEX OFFENDER MGMT, COLO. DEP’T 
OF SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (2004) available at 
http://dcj.state.co.us/ors/pdf/docs/FullSLAFinal.pdf. 
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living in “Shared Living Arrangements” or in a residence with a 
positive support system were less likely to reoffend.97  Similarly, 
Minnesota allows a parole officer to determine where a sex 
offender may live, and proximity to schools is just one of the 
many restrictions the officer considers.98  The Minnesota 
Department of Corrections expressly recommended against 
enacting mandatory residency restrictions: 
 Having such restrictions in the cities of Minneapolis and St. 
Paul would likely force level three offenders to move to more 
rural areas that would not contain nearby schools and parks 
but would pose other problems, such as a high concentration of 
offenders with no ties to the community; isolation; lack of 
work, education, and treatment options; and an increase in the 
distance traveled by agents who supervise offenders.
99
 
In support of this determination, the department noted that 
no evidence points to the efficacy of mandatory residency 
restrictions and that there had not been a single case of a level 
three offender reoffending at a nearby school.100  Thus, Colorado 
and Minnesota are the two most vocal states of the many that 
either oppose enacting or have yet to enact mandatory residency 
restrictions for sex offenders. 
C.  Legal Effect of Research 
In addition to questioning the effectiveness of residency 
restrictions, research increasingly raises legal questions about 
Miller II, the most authoritative decision to date, as well as many 
other state and federal court rulings.  First, the research suggests 
that mandatory residency restrictions are more punitive than 
regulatory in nature, and thus may violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  If no research shows that these restrictions reduce the 
number of repeat offenses, one must question what the laws are 
actually regulating.  Therefore, even if the legislature intends the 
law to be regulatory in nature, as the Eighth Circuit concluded, 
 
97 Id. at 36–37. 
98 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 87, at 2. 
99 Id. at 9. 
100 Id.  Note, however, that the Eighth Circuit disregarded this study in Miller II, 
stating, “this solitary case study–which involved only thirteen reoffenders released 
from prison between 1997 and 1999–does not make irrational the decision of the 
Iowa General Assembly and the Governor of Iowa to reach a different predictive 
judgment for Iowa.”  Miller II, 405 F.3d 700, 715 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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the actual punitive effect may override the legislature’s 
nonpunitive intent.101  For example, Georgia’s bus stop provision 
is so restrictive that its sponsors have openly touted it as a 
banishment law.102  If statistics prove that these measures have 
no effect on reducing the number of sex offenses involving 
minors, the overall effect of the law could be regarded as more 
punitive than regulatory.  Moreover, it is well documented that 
the public does not wish to live near sex offenders,103 suggesting 
that legislatures are simply responding to public wishes by 
issuing more punitive measures.  However, “‘only the clearest 
proof’” will allow a court to overturn a law on ex post facto 
grounds when a legislature enacts a measure with regulatory 
intent.104  Therefore, those evaluating residency restrictions need 
more time to determine with certainty whether the laws are 
effective in reducing the number of repeat offenses. 
Second, while the research does not question the findings of 
the Eighth Circuit on substantive and procedural due process 
claims, it does question whether legislatures have a rational basis 
for enacting residency restrictions.  When a court finds no 
violation of a due process right, it will apply the rational basis 
test.  In response, the State will argue that a residency restriction 
is intended to protect the health and safety of children.  While 
the rational basis test is highly deferential,105 increasing research 
indicates that there may not be even a rational basis for enacting 
a mandatory residency restriction.106  If a court accepts the 
 
101 See generally Hobson, supra note 17, at 990–92. 
102 As the lead sponsor, Jerry Keen, stated in a speech to senators, “[c]andidly, 
senators, [registered sex offenders] will in many cases have to move to another 
state.”  Scott Henry, Life in the Shadows, CREATIVE LOAFING ATLANTA, July 19, 
2006, http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A98753. 
103 One study found that when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, home 
values within a tenth of a mile drop an average of 4 percent.  Leigh L. Linden & 
Jonah E. Rockoff, There Goes the Neighborhood?  Estimates of the Impact of Crime 
Risk on Property Values from Megan’s Laws (33 Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12253, 2006). 
104 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 718 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)). 
105 See, e.g., Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2005); People v. 
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
106 See Singleton, supra note 10, at 615 (arguing the merits of a more meaningful 
rational basis review for residency restrictions).  Professor Singleton goes on to 
argue that since these laws are “obviously based on fear and prejudice,” they are 
“entitled no deference from the courts.”  Id. at 628 (discussing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985); and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
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findings of the Minnesota study,107 for example, forcing sex 
offenders underground and away from community management 
actually places children in greater danger.  The Leroy court was 
able to uphold the restriction because the legislature was 
“reasonable” in determining that the law reduced the 
“opportunity for the child sex offenders to commit new sex 
offenses.”108  The Miller II court was able to dismiss the 
Minnesota study because it was an isolated and limited study.109  
However, if more comprehensive and universally recognized 
research emerges to confirm what Minnesota has already 
learned, courts facing decisions similar to Miller II, Leroy, and 
Coston will be forced to reevaluate the effects of these 
restrictions, even while affording wide deference to legislatures 
under the rational basis test. 
III 
CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 83–A CASE STUDY 
California is currently in the middle of this debate, as 
opposing groups argue over the constitutionality and 
effectiveness of a newly enacted mandatory residency restriction.  
As the latest state embroiled in this debate, California’s 
experience serves as a valuable case study to reveal the recurring 
issues surrounding these restrictions.  In November 2006, 
California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 83 with 
70.5 percent of the vote.110  Among other provisions, Proposition 
83 prohibits any registered sex offender from residing within 
2000 feet of any school or park where children regularly 
gather.111  The law amends California’s previous residency 
restriction, which barred parolees convicted of specified sex 
offenses against a child from residing within one-quarter or one-
half mile of a school.112 
 
107 See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 87, at 11. 
108 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 777. 
109 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 714. 
110 Cal. Sec’y of State, State Ballot Measures, http://vote.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/ 
00.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007). 
111 Cal. Attorney Gen., supra note 11. 
112 See Proposition 83 Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, http://voterguide.ss.ca 
.gov/props/prop83/analysis83.html (last visited August 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
Proposition 83 Analysis]; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608.5 (West Supp. 
2007) (providing a minimum distance of a quarter mile). 
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A.  Events Prior to the November 2006 Election 
Prior to the November election, local newspapers reported on 
the various opinions toward Proposition 83.113  Becky Warren, a 
spokeswoman for Yes on 83, commented, “[t]he bottom line is 
that parents don’t want to have their children going to school 
next to a child molester.”114  The bill’s lead sponsors proclaimed 
that the 2000-foot restriction was necessary because it is the 
normal distance that children can walk to school on their own.115  
However, some of those in law enforcement, the group in charge 
of implementing the restriction, vehemently opposed the 
measure.116  Not only would the implementation and 
enforcement costs of the measure escalate to more than $100 
million per year within the first decade, but the measure would 
also turn entire cities into virtual “Predator Free Zones.”117  For 
example, all registered sex offenders would be prohibited from 
residing in San Jose, except for an industrial stretch along 
Monterey Highway and a wealthy neighborhood near the 
Almaden Country Club.118  As police Sgt. Ron Helder of San 
Jose stated, “[t]his is less about protecting children than 
politics.”119  Echoing these sentiments, Sgt. Blayn Persiani of 
Santa Clara argued:  “The intent of this law is good . . . [b]ut the 
resources needed to enforce it?  They aren’t there.”120 
In the summer leading up to the election, Research Specialist 
Marcus Nieto and Professor David Jung prepared a 
memorandum discussing the ramifications of the proposed 
Proposition 83 at the request of Assembly Member Mark Leno, 
Chair of the State Public Safety Committee.121  The detailed 
analysis reviewed other states’ residency restrictions, and 
included a brief examination of the limited existing research, the 
 
113 See, e.g., Sean Webby, Restrictions Will Drive Offenders Underground, 










121 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8. 
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Miller opinions from Iowa and other judicial opinions, and 
possible legal ramifications of Proposition 83.122  Most notably, 
the authors commented that the bill was overinclusive, as it 
applied to all sex offenders, not just sex offenders whose 
offenses involved minors.123  Since the Iowa statute in Miller II 
only applied to sex offenses involving a minor, the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision would be even less persuasive authority as 
applied to Proposition 83.124  Moreover, previous California 
appellate decisions imply that the state constitution may be more 
protective of a person’s right to choose a residence as part of the 
right to intrastate travel than the U.S. Constitution.125  By 
infringing on a substantive due process right, Proposition 83 may 
trigger strict scrutiny upon judicial review, a more stringent test 
than the rational basis test applied in Miller II.  For Proposition 
83 to be valid, then, a court would have to find that although it 
applied to all sex offenders, Proposition 83 was narrowly tailored 
to achieve the state’s compelling interest in protecting minors.126  
The authors concluded that it would be “extremely difficult to 
predict whether a statute restricting the residency of registered 
sex offenders who have never offended against a minor would be 
found constitutional by the Ninth Circuit.”127 
B.  Proposition 83 in Court 
Despite the opposition to Proposition 83 and the possible 
legal challenges surrounding it, the voters easily passed the 
ballot measure in the November election.  Just hours after the 
measure passed, opponents filed suit in San Francisco in Doe v. 
Schwarzenegger.128  The next day, U.S. District Judge Susan 
Illston issued a temporary restraining order against Proposition 
83’s residency restriction provision until the court decided the 




124 See id. at 44–45. 
125 Id. at 44. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. at 45. 
128 No. 06-6968 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006); see also Jenifer Warren, Judge Blocks 
Part of Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES.COM, Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/ 
news/local/politics/cal/la110806jessicaslaw,0,7781880.story?coll=la-home-headlines. 
129 Warren, supra note 128. 
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significant because a judge only grants a temporary restraining 
order when she believes that the plaintiff will prevail.  Attorneys 
for the plaintiff, “John Doe,” argued before the court that the 
residency restriction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
plaintiff’s substantive due process right by forcing offenders to 
move from their homes without notice.130  Judge Illston agreed, 
stating that “John Doe” had been “a law-abiding and productive 
member of his community” and would suffer “irreparable harm” 
if the residency restriction were implemented.131  The governor’s 
office issued a statement pledging to vehemently fight the 
lawsuit so “implementation of this vital measure can go forward 
to protect Californians against the lewd acts of convicted 
felons.”132 
Further legal questions surrounding Proposition 83 emerged 
during hearings and briefs filed in the San Francisco lawsuit.  It 
was unclear whether the law was to apply retroactively or only to 
offenders convicted subsequent to the passing of the bill, since 
Proposition 83 was silent on this issue.133  Although Sen. George 
Runner, a sponsor of the measure, never intended the residency 
restriction to apply to the 85,000 registered sex offenders already 
living in California, the State Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation started sending notices to registered sex offenders 
warning they might be required to move if they currently lived 
within 2000 feet of a school or park.134  Additionally, opponents 
of Proposition 83 had argued against it based on the belief that 
current sex offenders would be required to move.135 
U.S. District Judge Jeffrey White, the presiding judge in the 
San Francisco lawsuit, sought clarification from the Attorney 
General’s office on this issue.  In preliminary briefs, the 
Attorney General’s office stated that the residency restriction 
was not retroactive.136  However, in a subsequent hearing, 
Deputy Attorney General Teri Block told Judge White that 
 
130 See id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Proposition 83 Analysis, supra note 112. 
134 See Warren, supra note 128. 
135 Prop83.org, Stories from Sex Offenders, http://prop83.org/stories.html, (last 
visited August 8, 2007). 
136 Associated Press, Judge Extends Restraining Order Halting Prop. 83, 
CBS5.COM, Nov. 27, 2006, http://cbs5.com/politics/local_story_331150037.html. 
BOYD.FMT 2/22/2008  1:43:47 PM 
2007] How to Stop a Predator 239 
registered sex offenders who currently reside within a prohibited 
zone could remain in their homes, but would be required to 
comply with the new residency restriction if they moved, 
regardless of the date of their conviction.137  Judge White felt “a 
little bit ambushed” because the Attorney General was adopting 
“a completely new and different position than set forth in their 
papers.”138  Creating further legal uncertainty, U.S. District 
Judge Lawrence Karlton ruled on February 9, 2007, in another 
lawsuit challenging Proposition 83, that the residency restriction 
would not apply retroactively to those already registered as sex 
offenders.139  However, Judge Karlton left for a future case 
whether the law would apply to sex offenders who were not 
registered because they were serving time in prison at the time 
of the law’s passage.140  On February 23, 2007, Judge White, 
echoing Judge Karlton’s ruling, dismissed the San Francisco 
lawsuit by ruling that “John Doe” lacked standing to bring suit, 
as Proposition 83 could not be applied retroactively and 
therefore was not enforceable against the plaintiff.141  As a 
spokesman for the Attorney General’s office summarized the 
current state of the law, “[e]veryone now agrees this law is 
prospective, but what’s missing is a definitive legal decision on 
exactly who gets swept up by it.”142  Given that about 350 sex 
offenders who were in prison at the time Proposition 83 passed 
are up for parole each month, the law’s implementation remains 
uncertain.143  Currently, “most law enforcement agencies around 
the state are in a holding pattern in terms of how they should 
proceed.”144  Nevertheless, Governor Schwarzenegger released 
an illusory statement following Judge White’s decision, 
declaring, “[t]his ruling allows my administration to continue 
implementing the will of the people as expressed in this 




139 Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
140 Id. at 1179 n.1. 
141 Jennifer Warren, Prop. 83 Rulings Leave a Grey Area, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2007, at B-1. 
142 Id. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
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sex offenders.”145  However, until a court decides the 
constitutionality of the measure, and until the state determines 
who is subject to the law, Proposition 83 will fail to achieve any 
of its purported objectives. 
C.  Lessons from Proposition 83 
Proposition 83 is a useful example of the legal challenges 
states face when attempting to implement mandatory residency 
restrictions.  While the drafters of Proposition 83 may have 
intended to ensure the safety of children, it is also clear that the 
measure was primarily politically crafted to respond to the 
public’s fears.  In drafting the residency restriction, the authors 
blindly followed the popular trend of state legislatures across the 
country without considering whether the new law would 
withstand judicial review, whether the state had the resources to 
enforce such a law, or whether existing research supported the 
measure.  Proposition 83 highlights the legal uncertainty 
surrounding the constitutionality of residency restrictions, as 
various state and federal courts weigh in on the debate.  It is 
already clear that state courts, U.S. District Courts, and the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cannot agree on whether a 
residency restriction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
Constitution.  California is no exception, as both judges ruling on 
Proposition 83 expressed caution on the constitutionality of the 
measure.  As time passes and states experiment with different 
forms of mandatory residency restrictions, scholarly research 
increasingly opposes these measures,146 as do law enforcement 
officials who are responsible for implementing the resource-
draining restriction.147  Yet the public continues to support 
harsher limitations on sex offenders’ freedoms.  This issue will 
certainly reach many more federal courts of appeal in the near 
future, but ultimately will remain unclear until the Supreme 
Court rules on the topic. 
 
145 Id. 
146 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 84. 
147 See, e.g., IOWA COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 94. 
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IV 
OREGON’S NONMANDATORY RESIDENCY RESTRICTION–A 
BETTER MODEL? 
While California struggles to resolve issues surrounding 
Proposition 83, its northern neighbor, Oregon, has enacted a 
more flexible sex offender residency restriction while avoiding 
the media attention seen elsewhere.  As previously mentioned, 
twenty-two states have enacted some form of residency 
restrictions.  Eighteen of these residency restrictions are 
mandatory and apply uniformly to a classified group of sex 
offenders.148  However, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas have 
taken a different approach by allowing a parole board to 
determine whether residency restrictions apply to individual 
convicted sex offenders released on parole.149  This section will 
examine Oregon’s nonmandatory residency restriction, 
explaining why it serves as a more effective model to achieve the 
goals of protecting our children, reducing rates of recidivism, 
and withstanding judicial review. 
Oregon has a sizeable sex offender population, with over 
12,000 registered offenders.150  In fact, Oregon has the second-
highest number of registered sex offenders per 100,000 people in 
the entire country.151  Approximately one-third of all Oregon 
inmates are currently incarcerated for a sex crime or have a sex 
crime in their criminal history.152 
A.  Oregon’s Residency Restriction 
Oregon’s residency restriction is unique in that the law merely 
states a process to determine where a sex offender may reside 
following release from prison.  ORS 144.642 states the general 
principle “against allowing a sex offender to reside near 
 
148 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 8, at 17 tbl.2. 
149 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 
144.642 (2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.187 (Vernon 2004). 
150 Or. State Police, Sex Offender Registration About Us, 
http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/SOR/about_us.shtml (last visited August 5, 2007). 
151 Ellen Perlman, Where Will Sex Offenders Live?, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, 
June 2006, available at http://66.23.131.98/archive/2006/jun/sex.txt. 
152 See Or. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Population Profile for 8/1/2007, 
http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/RESRCH/docs/inmate_profile.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 
2007). 
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locations where children are the primary occupants or users.”153  
However, the law authorizes the Department of Corrections, in 
consultation with the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison 
Supervision, to develop a matrix to determine the permanent 
residence of a sex offender.154  As authorized, the Department of 
Corrections enacted OAR 255-060-0009, Residence 
Requirements for Certain Sex Offenders Upon Release from 
Custody: 
(1) A sex offender classified as a sexually violent dangerous 
offender (ORS 137.765) or a predatory sex offender (ORS 
181.765) may not reside near locations where children are the 
primary occupants or users. 
(2) This prohibition applies to permanent housing and not to 
transitional housing.  For purposes of this rule, transitional 
housing means housing intended to be occupied by a sexually 
violent dangerous offender or a predatory sex offender for 45 
days or less immediately after release from custody.
155
 
However, after stating these general principles, the 
Department of Corrections allows for exceptions in certain 
circumstances.  OAR 255-060-0009(3) states: 
(3) Exceptions to this prohibition may be made by the 
supervising parole/probation officer if it is determined that 
there is sufficient information to support this placement in 
terms of public safety and the rehabilitation of the offender.  In 
making this determination, the following factors must be 
considered: 
(a) Other residential placement options pose a higher risk 
to the community, or 
(b) An enhanced support system that endorses supervision 
goals and community safety efforts is available at this 
residence, or 
(c) Enhanced supervision monitoring will be in place (e.g. 
electronic supervision, curfew, live-in-care provider, along 
with community notification), or 
(d) This residence includes 24-hour case management, or 
(e) The offender is being released from prison 
unexpectedly and more suitable housing will be arranged 
as soon as possible.  If any of these factors apply to the 
offender and the residence under review, an exception to 




153 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(a). 
154 § 144.642. 
155 OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009(1)–(2) (2005). 
156 OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009(3). 
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In addition, a superceding law to the residency restriction 
requires all offenders on parole, regardless of their offense, to 
“reside for the first six months in the county where the inmate 
resided at the time of the offense that resulted in the 
imprisonment.”157  Like the residency restriction, exceptions 
apply under certain circumstances.158 
Darcey Baker, Board Member on the Board of Parole and 
Post-Prison Supervision, was a key author in drafting section 
144.642 of the Oregon Code.  Ms. Baker was previously a parole 
officer in Clackamas County for twenty-five years and is 
involved with the Oregon Sex Offender Supervision Network.159  
In her current capacity, she approves every residency restriction 
placed on a sex offender upon release from prison.160  In crafting 
the language of the residency restriction, Ms. Baker emphasized 
that the authors specifically made the prohibition against 
residing near where children gather to afford the parole officer 
wide discretion.161  Ms. Baker recounted a specific case that 
influenced the drafting of ORS 144.642, where a sex offender 
resided in a home near a school and church.162  Although the 
community was enraged by the placement, the sex offender 
would have been homeless otherwise and perhaps would have 
fled elsewhere to find housing.163  Knowing the offender’s 
location, law enforcement officers could effectively monitor his 
actions.164  As Ms. Baker stated, although this was not the ideal 
living arrangement, the alternative “would be more dangerous to 
the community.”165 
Conversely, in a recent case, a sex offender desired to live in a 
trailer on a two-plus acre lot, where the property dropped off 
into a wooded area that backed up into a new subdivision and 
 
157 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.270(5)(a); accord OR. REV. STAT. § 144.102(6)(a); OR. 
ADMIN. R. 255-070-0003(1). 
158 OR. REV. STAT. § 144.102(6); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.270(5); OR. ADMIN. R. 
255-070-0003(3). 
159 Oregon.gov, Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision Board Members, 
http://www.oregon.gov/BOPPPS/members.shtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). 
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was not separated by a fence.166  Since this was an area where 
children might play, the parole officer determined that the 
residence was not appropriate for a sex offender.167  Had the law 
merely prohibited a sex offender from living within 2000 feet of 
a school or church, this offender would have been able to reside 
at a potentially inappropriate location.168  The purposeful 
vagueness of the law provides the parole officer with the 
necessary discretion to determine the most appropriate 
residence for each sex offender, benefiting the community and 
the offender alike.169 
In describing the process of determining the residency 
restriction, Ms. Baker explained that the State Board of Parole 
and Post-Prison Supervision begins to review a sex offender’s 
case 120 days prior to release.170  At this time, the offender may 
request his or her preferred place of residence.171  The assigned 
parole officer has thirty days to conduct an investigation 
following the matrix outlined in OAR 255-060-0009.172  Thirty 
days prior to the sex offender’s release, the parole officer must 
make a determination.173  While most sex offenders are not 
represented by an attorney at this time, they may send a letter 
for administration review to contest the parole officer’s 
determination.174 
Summarizing the effectiveness of Oregon’s residency 
restriction, Ms. Baker stated that the policy “forces us to look at 
the individual offender, which is always better than a blanket 
policy.”175  Instead of enacting mandatory residency restrictions, 
Ms. Baker believes the best policy is to reintegrate the sex 
offender back into the community.176  Sex offenders will always 
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population . . . [because] the scariest sex offenders are the ones I 
don’t know about.”177 
B.  Benefits of Oregon’s Model 
Although Oregon’s residency requirement has not faced a 
constitutional challenge, Oregon’s model offers many 
advantages making it more likely to withstand judicial review.  
First, the primary challenge to residency restrictions is typically 
the ex post facto challenge, where the plaintiffs argue that the 
measure is more punitive in nature than regulatory.178  Under 
this challenge, Oregon’s residency restriction is readily 
distinguishable from the Iowa statute and Proposition 83 in 
California.  While Oregon’s law states the general prohibition 
that a sex offender may not live near places where children 
congregate, it allows exceptions to this rule.  This difference 
shows that the state does not treat all sex offenders alike, as the 
parole officer looks at each offender individually to see if there 
are overriding factors allowing an offender to live in a generally 
prohibited area.  The distinction allows the state to argue that 
the purpose and actual effect of the residency restriction is to 
find the most appropriate residence for a high-risk offender in a 
way that also protects the community.  Furthermore, there is no 
blanket “banishment” effect as in other states, as ORS 
144.270(5) supercedes the residency restriction by requiring that 
counties accept the sex offender back into their community.  In 
addition, the residency restriction only applies to permanent 
housing, so sex offenders are not forced to stay in prison longer 
than their sentences require due to an inability to find permitted 
housing, as was the case in Miller I.179 
Second, a substantive due process argument would also likely 
fail, because the exceptions to Oregon’s general prohibition 
make it impossible for sex offenders to argue that the state has 
infringed on their right to intrastate travel or their right to live 
with their families.  In fact, one of the exceptions specifically 
contemplates that the sex offender may live with an “enhanced 
 
177 Id. 
178 See Miller I, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 866 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Miller II, 405 F.3d 700, 
718 (8th Cir. 2005). 
179 See OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009(2) (2005). 
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support system.”180  Similarly, a procedural due process claim 
would likely fail, unlike in Miller I, as each offender is given an 
individual risk assessment.  If the offender poses no risk to 
children, the parole officer will more readily exercise one of the 
exceptions to the general residency prohibition. 
Finally, if a court finds no infringement of a constitutional 
right, Oregon will most likely be able to prove that the state’s 
residency restriction is rationally related to its legitimate interest 
in protecting the community.  Both the complex matrix the state 
uses and the thorough investigation completed by each parole 
officer show that the state has not adopted a blanket policy 
applying to all sex offenders.  The individual process for each 
offender demonstrates that Oregon has conducted the necessary 
research to find the most appropriate place in the community to 
protect the safety of its children. 
In addition to likely withstanding judicial review, Oregon’s 
residency restriction should be commended for its incorporation 
of the latest research on controlling sex offender populations.  
Not only does the process respect the constitutional rights of 
each offender through an individual assessment, it also strives 
for the primary goal of protecting children.  Instead of passing 
yet another NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) law, Oregon forces its 
counties to effectively manage their sex offender populations.  
Instead of pushing a sex offender underground, away from the 
eye of law enforcement, Oregon has created a system that 
encourages a sex offender to register and remain monitored. 
C.  Deficiencies of Oregon’s Model 
Despite the comprehensive research incorporated into 
Oregon’s sex offender residency restriction, the approach is still 
vulnerable to criticism.  While Oregon’s model most likely will 
survive the three common facial challenges, as discussed above, 
it could face a number of as-applied and procedural due process 
challenges that do not pertain to mandatory restrictions. 
Most notably, the discretion given to parole officers in 
providing individual risk assessments for offenders opens the 
door to increasing as-applied challenges.181  Allowing one sex 
 
180 OR. ADMIN. R. 255-060-0009(3)(b). 
181 This Comment has largely focused on facial challenges to residency 
restrictions.  However, both mandatory and nonmandatory residency restrictions 
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offender to live in a generally prohibited area due to mitigating 
factors sets a precedent for future sex offenders coming off 
parole.  While the Oregon statute expressly lists factors to 
consider in determining where a sex offender may live, the 
statute defers to the parole officer in deciding how much weight 
to give each factor.  The statute does not appear to provide any 
procedural safeguards to protect against potentially harmful 
individual discretion.  As a result, this model runs the risk of 
treating sex offenders in a disparate fashion, depending on the 
underlying preferences of each parole officer.  Given the lack of 
uniformity, the courts may be forced to review the vague 
instructions given parole officers and determine whether sex 
offenders are afforded sufficient notice of the repercussions of 
their actions. 
In addition, the case-by-case determination in the Oregon 
model raises questions about the procedural due process 
afforded each offender.  The only way an offender can challenge 
a parole officer’s determination of an appropriate residential 
location is by writing a letter for administrative review.  During 
this informal process, which is not articulated in the statute, most 
offenders are not represented by an attorney.  Since there is no 
explicit legal process for review besides filing a complaint, 
Oregon’s model may be, in effect, no better than a mandatory 
restriction.  Ultimately, as states experiment with differing forms 
of residency restrictions over time, a comprehensive comparative 
analysis will determine whether Oregon’s model is in fact the 
model to emulate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As states rush to pass mandatory residency restrictions 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from living in designated 
areas, increasing research suggests that such blanket policies are 
ineffective in reaching their desired objectives and may even 
have negative consequences.  Although various courts from 
Georgia to California have weighed in on the constitutionality of 
these laws, no consensus has emerged.  The Supreme Court has 
 
could be subject to numerous as-applied challenges.  The point here is that 
Oregon’s nonmandatory restriction is perhaps more ripe to potential as-applied 
challenges than mandatory restrictions. 
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declined to address this issue,182 although the Smith v. Doe183 
decision may help predict how the Court would rule.184  Given 
the conservative ideology of the majority of the Court for the 
foreseeable future, it will likely determine that the measure is 
not punitive in nature, thus denying the primary ex post facto 
challenge. 
Regardless of whether a mandatory residency restriction is 
constitutional, states should avoid the legal uncertainty and 
resist the temptation to pass legislation driven solely by the fears 
of our society.  Instead, states should act in a more rational 
manner by listening to the experts in the field and those who are 
responsible for enforcing the measures and should pursue the 
most effective method of reducing rates of recidivism.  Oregon is 
an example of a state that has proceeded in such a fashion.  If 
these measures are really about protecting the children, our 
elected officials should act in the children’s best interest. 
 
 
182 Doe v. Miller, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005). 
183 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
184 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that Alaska’s sex offender 
registration requirements did not pose an ex post facto problem.  Id. at 105–06.  
Justice Souter concurred only with the judgment, id. at 107–10, while Justices 
Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissented, id. at 110–17. 
